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Internationalisation of R&D into Emerging Markets: Fiat’s R&D in Brazil, 
Turkey and India 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
 
The idea that competence creating subsidiaries from emerging nations can contribute to 
and possibly renew sources of competitive advantage is an appealing one for 
managerial practice and policy. Many mature MNEs can look to exploit the 
technological and market capabilities of their more capable subsidiaries in order to tap 
into new sources of growth.  Based on a case study of Fiat and three of its emerging 
market R&D subsidiaries we show that successfully developing competence-creating 
subsidiaries is a difficult task. Not only do parent and subsidiary managements have 
different ideas of what is involved but subsidiary technological capability and local 
resources do not fully explain new technology creation mandates. The success of 
overall product market strategies and the mode of entry also exercise important effects.  
Furthermore in our case study we find that internal embeddedness is more crucial than 
external embeddedness in distinguishing a successful new technology creation 
mandate.
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Internationalisation of R&D into Emerging Markets: Fiat’s R&D in Brazil, 
Turkey and India 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the late 1990s the rapid internationalisation of research and development (R&D) by 
many multinational enterprises (MNEs) into emerging markets, led to speculation amongst 
scholars about whether this constituted a novel trend capable of shifting MNE innovation 
into new regions. It is fair to say that there are as many pessimistic as optimistic views of 
this phenomenon. The pessimists caution that internationalisation of R&D has never 
involved very significant volumes of innovative activity and even in 2010, Patel (2011) 
showed that the larger volumes of technological knowledge typically are generated in the 
home countries of MNEs and in the home country’s strongest technological fields (Patel 
and Pavitt, 1991; Verspagen and Schoenmaker, 2004; Patel, 2011). This strand of research 
points to the domination of this centripetal tendency because orchestrating global 
innovation can be both risky and complex to manage. Different and less adequate 
institutional features of new locations to support innovation activities make the geographic 
dispersion of R&D risky. The uncertainty of R&D outcomes and the need to conform to 
product market imperatives make MNEs’ R&D decisions both more complex and highly 
‘mission critical’. As a result, most ‘significant’ R&D tends to be centralised in the parent 
company with the result that competence creation occurs there rather than in host locations. 
 
The optimists believe that the dispersion of R&D facilities reflects a desire to find and 
exploit new markets through adaptive innovation, and to tap into new sources of 
technological knowledge and competitive advantage in a globalised world (Cantwell, 
1995). They point out that there are huge rewards for the effective management of 
competence creating subsidiaries in geographically dispersed locations. The MNE can 
emerge as a hydra-headed organisation whose various branches in different geographical 
locations can exploit as well as renew competitive advantage through the 
internationalisation of R&D (Kuemmerle, 1997; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). There is a 
rich literature on competence creating subsidiaries and their characteristics, which range 
from the dual embeddedness of subsidiaries in the local environment and in the MNE 
network of parent and affiliates (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Meyer et al., 2011); drivers of 
subsidiary roles (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991); to identifying  mechanisms that can change 
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subsidiary roles (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998); and organisational innovation enabled by 
the participation of capable subsidiaries (Gerybadze and Reger, 1999; Lahiri, 2010). 
 
The idea that competence creating subsidiaries from emerging nations can contribute to and 
possibly renew sources of competitive advantage is appealing for managerial practice and 
policy related to international investment. Many mature MNEs (such as those in Europe) 
can expect to exploit the technological and market capabilities of their more capable 
subsidiaries in order to tap into new sources of growth especially in the new phase of 
globalisation that began in the 1990s and which has encompassed several emerging 
markets.  However, as the introduction to this Special Issue, and other papers in this 
volume make clear, we still have much to learn about the process of building competence 
creating subsidiaries, and the managerial and other challenges involved in creating 
technological advantages for firms from their subsidiaries in different geographical 
locations. Our paper makes a contribution to a better understanding of the barriers and 
enablers of competence-creation and new technological development in emerging market 
locations.  
 
We focus on a European MNE (Fiat) in the automobile sector -- one of the first sectors to 
internationalise R&D (Dicken, 2003; Manning et al., 2009). Fiat’s ‘selective globalisation 
strategy’, adopted in the mid-1990s, shifted some of its R&D out of Europe into emerging 
markets such as Turkey, Brazil and India. Using a case-study approach we study both the 
headquarters (HQ) R&D centre and affiliate R&D centres in emerging markets to shed 
light on the constraints and managerial challenges involved in managing competence 
creating subsidiaries in emerging markets and the constraints to new technology 
development from these subsidiaries. 
  
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1: Roles of Headquarters and Subsidiary 
 
Early understanding about the functioning of MNEs was linked to the product life cycle 
(Vernon, 1966) and internationalization process (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) models. In 
both models, the MNE HQ has a dominant role and the MNE’s foreign subsidiaries are 
totally dependent on centralised knowledge creation undertaken primarily in HQ locations 
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(Dunning, 1981; Patel and Pavitt, 1991). Subsidiaries were often mini-replicas of the parent 
and encompassed a range of functions such as production, sales and adaptive R&D. From 
the mid-1980s, the push towards globalisation saw the replica model of subsidiary 
organisation retreat and MNEs began to reorganise by rationalising some activities (to 
avoid duplication) and by increasing specialisation of their production and R&D activities 
(Narula and Dunning, 2010).   
 
Kogut and Zander (2003) note that following entry to a country the MNEs’ subsequent 
expansion in the host location was a result of successful acquisition and recombination of 
local knowledge. At the same time, international expansion changes the global knowledge 
available to the MNE and imbues its subsidiaries with more power resulting in a 
transformation of the MNE to become part of a network of subsidiaries characterised by 
cross-border transfers of learning. The importance to an MNE of the capabilities of its 
subsidiaries for the company’s competitive advantage should not lead to the conclusion that 
all subsidiaries are equal or should be treated equally. In dismissing this notion as the ‘UN 
model’ of MNE governance, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986, 1991) argue that the role of the 
subsidiary within the MNE network is determined by the level of the subsidiary’s  
capability and the strategic importance of the local markets in which it operates.  
 
Based on a study of subsidiaries of a number of MNEs, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986) argue 
that large or technically important local markets are likely to be of strategic significance. A 
high-capability subsidiary operating in a market perceived as strategically important can 
achieve the role of strategic leader and command a greater share of MNE resources, but a 
high capability subsidiary operating in a market of very little strategic importance will 
continue to be a contributor and may see the resources it develops being applied in other 
parts of the group. Low-capability subsidiaries operating in strategically important markets 
may be like black holes, drawing in resources from the rest of the group, while low-
capability subsidiaries operating in markets of small strategic importance, have no access to 
critical information and scarce resources, and are considered implementers, as ‘deliverers 
of the company’s value-added’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991: 100).  
 
Contemporary models of MNEs that see the strategic role of subsidiaries in the creation of 
MNE specific advantage are referred to as heterarchical models (Hedlund, 1986) compared 
to the hierarchical models implied by the product life cycle and the internationalisation 
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literature. In heterarchical models, it is acknowledged that although the HQ treats the 
subsidiaries as partners in value creation, there can be tension between the two sides – most 
notably over the control and distribution of MNE resources, the control of agendas for 
growth and the execution of corporate strategy. In hierarchical models, most tensions are 
around coordination and operational issues. Contemporary models of MNE, ironically, 
promise greater rewards from subsidiary activities and participation, but also predict 
greater tension between parent and subsidiary in the process. We can expect the same kinds 
of tensions to characterise MNEs keen to develop technological strength using competence 
creating subsidiaries. 
 
2.2 Characteristics of Competence Creating Subsidiaries 
 
Competence creating subsidiaries are subsidiaries set up to promote innovation rather than 
sales. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1991) and Rugman, Verbeke and Yuan (2011) suggest that the 
concept of subsidiary capability can relate to production, sales, innovation or administrative 
support, and provide examples of MNEs that define their subsidiaries in these terms. They 
argue also that local environments may have high strategic value due to the existence of a 
lead market (as discussed by Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986) or due to technology and other 
factors such as supplies of labour and natural resources. The endowments of local 
environments can be linked to a particular task or role or to particular combinations with 
the subsidiary’s resources. Subsidiaries that are strategic leaders in innovation are able 
successfully to combine in-house capabilities with location specific assets; implementers 
earn revenue for the company by exploiting most MNE specific assets. 
 
The importance of combinative capability in subsidiaries in the MNE internationalisation 
R&D strategy has been studied widely. Kogut and Zander (1992) and Phene and Almedia 
(2008) show that sourcing and combinative capabilities have significant influence on the 
scale and quality of innovation, specifically, combinative capability enhances innovation in 
subsidiaries by diffusing knowledge within the firm and integrating knowledge from 
different sources. This idea resonates with the finding of ‘dual embeddedness’ of 
competence creating subsidiaries, which, in turn, is associated with their better innovative 
performance (Figueiredo, 2011; Meyer et al., 2011). Dual embeddedness refers to the 
development of knowledge-intensive linkages with speciﬁc internal and external actors 
simultaneously.  
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Studies on the embeddedness of the subsidiary in different institutional and competitive 
contexts using a more sociological perspective of informal interpersonal ties have a long 
history (Uzzi 1996, 1997; Andersson 1996; Andersson, Forsgrem Holm, 2002).  These 
earlier studies were not only about technological embeddedness but distinguished between 
technical, structural, and business embeddedness of subsidiaries.  The major insight of 
these studies was to point out that embeddedness was very closely linked to differing 
competitive and institutional situations which in turn could be a source of competitive 
advantage for the parent firm.  However, they also recognise that such competitive 
advantage needs the internal embeddedness of the subsidiary while local embeddedness 
may favour greater autonomy for the subsidiary.   
 
The important point to underline is that  while recent papers view dual embeddedness as 
favoring subsidiary innovativeness, a subsidiary does not need to be dual embedded to 
perform internal transfer or when only a one-way transfer of technology (e.g. from parent 
to subsidiary) is needed; internal embeddedness is enough for a subsidiary to accomplish 
this.  The Mudambi et al paper in this volume also highlights this point in the context of 
reverse technology transfer. Dual embeddedness would however, benefit both subsidiary 
innovativeness and transfer by making three-way communication possible viz. from the 
parent to subsidiary, from the local context to the subsidiary and from the subsidiary to the 
parent.   
 
The more recent literature on the geography of the MNE also qualifies that the leader or 
laggard status of the MNE in its sector will determine the extent of its local embeddedness.  
Clustering in locations may be detrimental to leading firms in industries who have more 
knowledge to spillover to rivals and so the strategic deterrence thesis posits that technology 
leaders are deterred from entering clusters for fear of knowledge outflows.  (Cantwell and 
Santangelo 2002; Alcacer and Chung 2007).  With rising industry concentration, this 
explanation may be reversed.  Thus, Cantwell and Mudambi (2011) argue that in the 
presence of high knowledge stocks and industrial concentration, dominant firms can attract 
suppliers and customers far more strongly to their network and so shut out weaker firms 
from entering the same networks.  
 
Demand-led factors are also important for enabling R&D. Cantwell and Mudambi (2005) 
note that higher levels of local sales and demand provide a greater incentive for process 
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improvements and allow differentiation which increases profit margins. This finding is 
supported by Quadros and Consoni (2009) in a study of European MNE subsidiaries in 
Brazil, which shows that the product development capabilities of foreign auto subsidiaries 
vary with increasing scale. This might be due to the development of specialised assets and 
Penrosian capabilities within subsidiaries as a consequence of expanded scale and better 
division of labour within the subsidiary. 
 
Although successful competence creating subsidiaries appear to exhibit a virtuous cycle in 
which higher demand for products fuels technological capabilities, and dual embeddedness 
results in the transfer of new knowledge to other MNE affiliates, not much is known about 
the relative importance of each factor (demand factors, dual embeddedness  and internal 
embeddedness) in determining competence creating roles in MNE subsidiaries. This is the 
area explored in this paper. 
 
2.3 Changes in subsidiary role 
 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) identify head office assignment, subsidiary capability and 
local environmental factors as factors determining the subsidiary’s role. Although changes 
in any of these factors could result in a changed role for the subsidiary, Birkinshaw and 
Hood identify and emphasise two main mechanisms for charter change, viz. parent-directed 
investment, and subsidiary-driven initiatives, which could be described generally as being 
predominantly top-down and predominantly bottom up. Parent company-directed initiatives 
may enhance the subsidiary’s role through increased investments, but such initiatives may 
be a response to decreased subsidiary capability. On the other hand, subsidiary lobbying 
could lead to an enhanced role for the subsidiary, which may be reinforced by a greater 
focus on mandated tasks, which may result in an upgrading of its capabilities.  
 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) propose that contextual factors might influence which 
mechanism predominates. Parent-directed processes are likely to dominate in corporate 
environments characterised by poor intra-corporate competition for resources, strong 
centralisation of decision-making, ethnocentrism among management, strong government 
support for investments, and particularly good subsidiary track record. High quality parent-
subsidiary links and an entrepreneurial orientation among subsidiary employees favour 
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subsidiary-driven processes. The richness of the local context and the strategic impact of 
the location do not privilege either mechanism in particular.  
 
In the context of R&D subsidiaries, Kuemmerle (1997) distinguishes between home-base 
exploiting and home-base augmenting subsidiaries, and suggests that they are quite 
different functionally and organisationally. Using the headquarters vantage point, 
Kuemmerle  (1997) argues that home-base augmenting subsidiaries are usually smaller 
sized, headed by star scientists, likely to have good links with basic science networks in the 
host country and to be more parent company directed and less evolutionary in their set-up.
5
 
Home-base exploiting subsidiaries are likely to be larger companies, managed by people 
experienced in production management, with good links with production managers in sister 
companies. Home-base exploiting subsidiaries have good liaison with local customers and 
achieve greater levels of local embeddedness (Ambos, 2005).  
 
Using the subsidiary point of view, Hood and Young (1982) and Pearce (1994) classify 
foreign R&D labs according to three distinct types based on their roles. The first type is 
R&D Support Laboratories (SLs), whose main role is to adapt existing products and 
processes. The second type is Locally Integrated Laboratories (LILs), which work in close 
coordination with various other functions in the subsidiary’s local environment in order to 
develop or customize products according to local needs and demand. The third type is 
Internationally Interdependent Laboratories (IILs), which are not systematically connected 
with the MNE’s production units, and work with other interdependent networks across the 
globe, to identify and create new products and processes. Thus, SLs and LILs are oriented 
toward adaptation of existing products and their distribution in host markets, while IILs are 
fairly independent research units where novel research is conducted.  
 
From the vantage point of subsidiaries, the evolution of roles in R&D from SL, to LIL and 
IIL may involve a shift from competence exploitation to competence creation and may be 
subject to the processes and mechanisms identified by Birkinshaw and Hood (1998).   
  
3.   Research Methodology 
 
3.1  Research Design 
                                                 
5
 None of the subsidiaries studied in our paper are  home-base augmenting subsidiaries. 
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We believe we can better explore the factors that influence the evolution of competence 
creating subsidiaries in emerging markets through a focus on multiple subsidiaries of a 
single firm. Thus, our research design allows us to study multiple R&D locations in 
emerging markets, within a single MNE. This is akin to an embedded case study design, 
since it involves more than one sub-unit of analysis (Yin, 2003). We focus on Fiat 
Automotives, a European MNE in the automotive sector, and draw on data gathered 
through interviews with managers at the parent R&D centre and subsidiary R&D centres in 
three emerging markets - Turkey, Brazil and India.  
 
Dicken (2003: 376) notes that ‘although the automobile industry is undoubtedly a global 
industry, there is a good deal of variety in the specific corporate and competitive strategies 
adopted by the leading companies’. Thus, the transnational strategies of General Motors 
and Ford in the mid 1980s were triggered by the existence of protective barriers around 
major national markets as well as by the high costs of transporting assembled automobiles 
from the US, but the strategy of Japanese firms in the same period, was to establish major 
integrated production systems in three global regions (Asia, North America and Europe). 
Most European manufacturers with the exception of Germany’s Volkswagen, engaged in 
more limited global expansion, although by 2000, European automobile production 
networks had changed as a result of the opening up of Eastern Europe.  
 
Manning et al. (2009) note that automobile was one of the first sectors to offshore 
engineering and design in globally distributed locations. Waning demand in advanced 
western countries has moved the centre of gravity of the auto industry strongly towards 
emerging markets. Sturgeon et al. (2009) report that while global vehicle production more 
than doubled between 1975 and 2007, much of this growth can be attributed to Indian, 
Chinese, Brazilian, Mexican and few East European economies’ markets. International auto 
manufacturers also set up plants in emerging markets to take advantage of value chain 
savings through cost reductions and more efficient component procurement practices.  
 
Fiat is typical of a large European MNE with global R&D and production. For the 1970s 
and much of 1980s Fiat followed a strategy of developing their cars Italy, which then were 
produced and adapted to local needs by national subsidiaries. Balcet and Enrietti (1999) 
and Dunford (2009) identify a strategic shift in Fiat’s thinking in the mid-1990s in response 
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to increasing competition and falling sales in Fiat’s key West European markets. This 
involved moving into emerging markets (where substantial growth in small-car volumes 
was foreseen) within a strategy of ‘selective globalisation’. 
 
Fiat’s R&D investments in emerging markets, while specific to their strategic vision and 
competitive situation, nevertheless are quite representative of the forces thought to 
influence the internationalisation of R&D in the automotive sector. Fiat was not a pioneer 
or leader in the trend towards of internationalisation of R&D, and when competitors 
adopted a similar course, Fiat was keen to adopt sector best practice. At the same time, the 
shift in strategy provided a natural experiment to study the emergence of competence 
creating roles in R&D subsidiaries.   
 
3.2 Sources of data for the case study 
 
3.2.1: Interview data 
 
Empirical
6
 material for the study was gathered from a series of interviews (15 in total, see 
Appendix 1) undertaken at Fiat R&D facilities between July 2009 and August 2011.In 
addition to at the parent R&D unit, Centero Ricerche Fiat (CRF), we interviewed R&D 
mangers in subsidiaries in Turkey, Brazil and India. In Brazil face-to-face we interviewed 
senior managers at two subsidiaries (FIASA and FPT Brazil) located in Betim and Belo 
Horizonte. In India, the Head of R&D and the VP of the Engineering and Design (E&D) 
Centre, FIAL, in Pune, were interviewed. In Turkey, R&D managers were interviewed at 
the Fiat joint venture (JV), Tofaş, in Bursa, and at two other R&D facilities (Mekatro R&D 
in Gebze and Platform R&D in Bursa). Transcripts of the interviews were sent to respective 
interviewees for comment and validation. 
 
The histories of the three emerging market subsidiaries vary (see Table 1). All started out 
as marketing subsidiaries, two as JVs with local partners. The R&D function was added 
after the mid-1990s.  
 
3.2.2 Secondary data sources 
                                                 
6
 Interview data were generated within the EC 7th Framework Programme (FP7) project Impact of Networks, 
Globalisation, and their Interaction with EU Strategies (INGINEUS). We thank INGINEUS partners for help 
with the interviews in Brazil and Italy. The full list of interviews is provided in Appendix 1. 
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In order to contextualise and interpret our interview evidence we drew on data from a range 
of secondary sources including business press reports (e.g. the Economist), and secondary 
data on Fiat from academic studies. In order to assess subsidiary innovative capability we 
used Fiat Group’s patent data published by the European Patent Office (EPO), US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the national patent offices in Turkey, India and 
Brazil.  
 
Table 1: Fiat Affiliates in Emerging Markets which were interviewed 
 
Turkey Brazil India 
Tofaş 
 
Fiat Automotives 
(FIASA)  
Fiat Powertrain (FPT) 
Fiat India Automobiles 
Ltd. (FIAL)  
 
JV between Fiat and Koç 
Holding, one of the earliest 
Auto producers set up in 
1968. 
 
R&D Centre established in 
1994 without the support of 
the HQ and funded by Koç  
Holdings and the Turkish 
Government 
 
Wholly-owned 
subsidiary and the first 
MNE production plant in 
Betim, in 1974. 
  
R&D Centre established 
(1996), benefited from 
available local 
government incentives 
 
JV between Fiat & Tata 
Motors, set up in 2007 
which replaced the 1951 
JV with Premier Auto 
Ltd.  
 
R&D Centre established 
(2008) 
 
 
4. Fiat’s international R&D  
 
The geographical distribution of Fiat car sales between 1991-2011 depicted in Figure 2 
shows that Europe represented Fiat’s largest market outside Italy up to the late 1990s, after 
which time Brazil and the Rest of the World became more important.
7
 Figure 3 depicts the 
geographical spread of Fiat’s R&D centres in two periods, showing that it mirrored its 
production spread. The majority of its R&D centres have traditionally been located in 
                                                 
7
 Fiat routes most of its production and sales in the MERCOSUR region, via Brazil.  
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Europe, but NAFTA and regions outside Europe are seeing some increase in R&D 
subsidiaries.  
 
Balcett and Enriettti (1999) note two aims of the selective globalisation strategy adopted by 
Fiat: first to produce a ‘global car’, especially oriented to the needs of emerging markets in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia, based on the successful Brazilian 
experience,
8
 and second to achieve cost savings and realise efficiency gains  based on 
modular production with a common floor plan, component commonality and five 
alternative bodies, representing technological division of activity among large subsidiaries. 
Thus, the development of component production capability in each subsidiary location was 
an important determinant of the location decisions related to production and (adaptive) 
R&D. 
 
Ciravegna (2005) outlines in some detail the organisational changes that selective 
globalisation involved for Fiat. Starting from an innovation network where Fiat directly 
controlled every subsidiary, the new strategy envisaged the organisation of subsidiary value 
chains. Some subsidiaries were identified as more important partners of the HQ for this 
effort, and were referred to as production poles or Tier 1 subsidiaries. Initially these were 
located in Brazil, Turkey, Poland and Argentina. At the time of our interviews in 2009, 
there were only two Tier 1 subsidiaries conducting significant volumes of R&D viz. Brazil 
(which had absorbed the activities formerly performed by the Argentinean subsidiary) and 
Turkey. The Polish subsidiary was an important production pole, but performed little R&D. 
In Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1986) framework and locally integrated labs in the Pearce (1994) 
Tier 1 subsidiaries seemed to play the role of ‘strategic leaders’. The material and 
information exchange between the HQ and Tier 1 subsidiaries were expected to be more 
frequent and important, suggesting more internal embeddedness.  
                                                 
8
Dunford (2009) reports that the ‘global car’ was a small car forecast to cost about $8,000 (pre-tax).  
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Figure 2: Geographical distribution of passenger car and light commercial vehicles 
sales (in thousands) 
 
RoW- Rest of the World; RoWE- Rest of Western Europe; Sources: Fiat Group Annual Reports, 
Dunford (2009). 
 
Figure 3: R&D Centres distribution across the world regions 
 
Europe includes EU 27 + EFTA (Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland); NAFTA 
includes USA, Mexico and Canada; MERCOSUR includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
and Venezuela; ROW means Rest of the World. 
Sources: Fiat Group Annual Report 1999; Fiat Group Annual Report 2011. 
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There were significant information and material exchanges between Tier 1 and Tier 2 
subsidiaries. These latter were located in India, China, Venezuela, Morocco, Egypt and 
South Africa and were envisaged as assembly plants. The reasoning was that compatibility 
and endogenous modularity of design and parts ensured production could be shifted among 
plants as relative prices changed, thus generating an element of competition among Fiat 
subsidiaries, and creating incentives for local managers to focus on continuous 
performance improvements. Production, sales, innovation and administrative functions 
were amalgamated in Tier 1 subsidiaries, but Tier 2 subsidiaries were not crucial for the 
execution of innovation-related tasks. The R&D performed in Tier 2 firms was mainly 
related to adapting products to local requirements – e.g. fuel quality, road conditions, and 
policy regulations and requirements. In Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1986) framework they can 
be likened to contributors, and to support labs in Pearce’s (1994) framework 
 
In our interviews with CRF, we asked how R&D tasks were distributed between the home 
and other locations, in order to try to understand the factors that were important to HQ’s 
assignment of subsidiary roles. We found their assignment to be fairly typical of firms that 
had been national champions in the 1990s - strategic R&D performed in close interaction 
with the home country knowledge base, and relying on Italian universities and research 
institutes for basic research. One of our interviewees told us that :  
 In general, researchers and engineers in Italy develop core technologies and 
products which have global relevance and are later spread worldwide (common rail, 
multi-air, environmental friendly cars,). Local centres are generally focused on the 
customization of basic technologies on the specific needs of their market. 
There are exceptions, of course, for example, basic R&D in bio-fuels and diesel technology 
is performed in the Brazilian subsidiary.  
 
There is centralisation of R&D decision making, and a well-defined hierarchy of R&D 
functions in different locations in Fiat. One advantage of such an arrangement is that it 
eases knowledge transfer within the MNE, and between production centres, since the 
knowledge crucial to a particular market was located there. An interviewee said that: ‘In 
any case, it is not necessary to transfer all the information, but only those which are 
needed’. Another advantage of this strategy was that poor IP protection in the host location 
(a perennial problem in emerging economies) was less of an issue for the location of R&D. 
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The company patented its innovations. As local innovation was useful only in that 
particular market, the patent provided protection from local competition.  
 
In response to questions about the evolution of subsidiary R&D mandates, we were told 
that although different R&D centres had different functions and had evolved differently, ‘In 
general, the Group tries to avoid any duplication of functions, in order to reduce the waste 
of resources and increase effectiveness: this principle is always taken into account when a 
new centre is created or new activities are assigned’. Accordingly governance of 
international R&D was the responsibility of a Central Committee that decided about which 
technologies to transfer and how - mostly achieved by a system of agreement and 
delegation. Local centres could propose new products, test their feasibility and request 
financial resources for experimentation and testing. Avoiding duplication of functions 
promoted technology collaboration among, which competed only for funding from HQ. 
 
Researchers at the CRF considered two factors as important for driving international R&D: 
closeness to the local markets, and the competencies and knowledge existing in the local 
country. This latter was contrary to expectations: we expected that it would be the local 
competence of the subsidiary that would to matter as suggested by Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1986, 1991) and Birkinshaw and Hood (1998). Our interviews clarified that whilst the 
competence of the local subsidiary was important, ‘the level and quality of local 
competencies depended also on the degree of collaboration with the universities and on the 
presence of a good education system, offering highly trained human resources’. Second 
order networks (described by one interviewee as ‘networks of networks’) are also 
considered important for location decisions although we were unable to elicit examples of a 
R&D subsidiary being set up principally for this reason. Several interviewees told us that in 
many cases where Fiat has no direct contacts, existing networks with universities or other 
partners are exploited. This is consistent with Fiat’s policy of partnering with established 
firms in Turkey and India and supports the view that innovation occurs in subsidiaries that 
are well embedded in the local milieu. 
 
Fiat clearly sees collaboration as important for cutting the high costs of production and 
research. Although our main interest is in the internationalisation of R&D it should be 
noted that Fiat entered into many production collaborations with suppliers in order to 
reduce costs (Dunford, 2009). Collaborative activity is an important component of its R&D 
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internationalisation in Europe and, at the time of our interviews, Fiat had more than 1,500 
partners in Europe (including universities, research centres and other firms) and had 
participated in about 560 European Commission funded research projects.  
 
The main mechanism for exchanging technological information is exchanges of engineers 
between CRF in Turin and the subsidiary. Because its engineers use common design tools, 
Fiat has been successful in using virtual platforms and information and communication 
technologies (ICT) for knowledge transfer, confirmed by interviews with R&D subsidiary 
managers. The effect was most pronounced in reduced time-to market: Fiat claims to have 
the shortest time–to-market (15 months) in the automotive sector.9 This was achieved 
because the design of both the Bravo and 500 models relied on computer simulations rather 
than prototypes (Economist, 2008).  
 
 
5. Fiat’s R&D subsidiaries in emerging markets 
 
Fiat’s R&D activities in emerging markets are market-driven and consist of adaptive R&D 
to support their production subsidiaries in those regions. Product customization and 
intensified localisation of components and systems was required to respond to difficult road 
conditions and variations in fuel quality. Also, carbon emissions and safety regulations 
differed from those in developed markets. Some markets (e.g. Brazil, India) also had local 
content requirements for cars produced and sold locally.  
 
Tofaş, Fiat’s JV in Turkey, is its oldest emerging market R&D centre (set up in 1994) 
followed by the wholly owned subsidiary in Brazil (set up in 1996). The Indian subsidiary 
was established in 2008, although a production JV with Premier Cars has been in place in 
India since 1951.   
 
In two of the three emerging markets we study (Turkey and India) a JV was considered 
more practical for production and R&D than a wholly owned subsidiary. Joint venturing 
for R&D is unusual since it introduces the risk of technology leakages and can result in loss 
of focus if one partner is not fully committed. As noted in Section 4, most R&D decisions 
about tasks and apportioning of resources in Fiat are centralised. Birkinshaw and Hood 
                                                 
9
 The Economist (2008) reported that Fiat had cut its time to market from 26 to 18 months 
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(1998) suggest that this type of corporate level structure favours parent-led investment and 
divestment of subsidiary roles, which is at odds with the partnership model implicit in a JV. 
These tensions may have influenced the evolution of roles in the Turkish and Indian 
subsidiaries. 
 
The salient characteristics of the three emerging market subsidiaries we study are outlined 
in Table 2 below. The Brazilian subsidiary is clearly the most important overseas 
subsidiary and one of our interviewees noted that the second in command at Fiat had spent 
some time there, suggesting a stronger parent-subsidiary link. Brazil and especially Turkey 
have a large number of patents – the traditional measure of innovative capability. However, 
only the Brazilian subsidiary seems to collaborate on innovation with sister affiliates, 
suggesting greater co-invention and internal embeddedness. This suggests that the dual 
embedded subsidiary is selected on characteristics other than technology capability alone.  
 
Table 2: Salient characteristics of Fiat’s Emerging Market subsidiaries 
 Turkey  Brazil India 
 
Innovation Inputs, 2010 
R&D spend  €100 million € 270 million € 30 million 
R&D Staff  391 857 80 
Engineers % of total staff  65% 73% 85% 
 
Education level of R&D staff (count) 
    PhD 5 9 0 
    Post Graduates 67 197 28 
   Graduates 184 423 40 
Vocational 135 228 12 
 
Innovation Outputs (Count of patents filed), 2012 
Total 
National patent office* 
EPO^ 
USPTO 
    71 
    38 
    33 
     0 
47 
37 
5 
5 
        0 
       0 
       0 
       0 
Collaborative patents filed 
involving HQ inventors 
 
     0 
 
0 
 
       0 
Collaborative patents with 
other afiliates  
Total  
 
 
     0 
 
 
5 
 
 
       0 
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European Patent Office 
US Patent Office 
      0 
     0 
2  
3  
       0 
       0 
 
Sources: *Turkish patent institute http://www.tpe.gov.tr/portal/default.jsp; PATENTSCOPE, World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) http://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/search.jsf; IP 
Intellectual Property India, http://www.ipindia.nic.in/. 
^ EPO, http://worldwide.espacenet.com/?locale=en_EP  
^^USPTO, http://appft1.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html; 
 
 
5.1 Turkey - Tofaş 
 
Tofaş is central to Fiat’s global production strategy, one of whose aims was to supply the 
Russian market with production from Tofaş. The decision to conduct R&D in Tofaş, 
however, was taken by Koç  Holding, the other partner in the joint venture, presumably 
because some adaptive R&D was necessary to respond to local needs and to increase local 
sales. This was an autonomous decision, enabled by the resources of the independent JV 
partner and subsidised by the Turkish State.   In interview,  the R&D director of Tofaş said: 
 
 In 1994 when we established the R&D department, this met no enthusiasm at Fiat 
initially: Fiat’s main goal was open production in Turkey, but there was no thought 
of involving Tofaş in Fiat’s R&D activities. On the other hand, we were very 
ambitious to start R&D in Turkey. We definitely believed that establishing R&D 
would not only enable us to improve our product quality, but it would also increase 
the added value in new models. Although our managers believed that we would be 
able to succeed in contributing to the R&D activities of both; Fiat believed that 
forming R&D with a local partner would not make any substantial contribution. 
Thus, we took this decision alone, without asking Fiat. The first humble step was to 
establish an emissions laboratory, but subsequently Fiat recognized the benefit of 
this expansion and let us establish our own development team. 
 
The perception of Tofaş’s R&D manger is that Fiat’s recognition of the value of using the 
new R&D capability in Tofaş was forced by cost-considerations. Fiat recorded losses of €4 
billion in 2001. The cost advantage R&D hirings at Tofaş represented a 50% saving on 
similar Italian engineering hires.
10
 In addition, since 2008, according to Turkey’s R&D 
Law, up to 30% of the R&D projects of Tofaş were eligible for funding from the Turkish 
government. Since 1996, the Turkish government has funded 29 R&D projects through the 
                                                 
10
 Interviewee’s estimate for 2001. 
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Scientific and Technology Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) Technology and 
Innovation Support Programmes (TEYDEB).  
 
The first product development project, initially involving eight people and €26.76 million 
was the Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) Adaptation of the Murat 131 (the Tofaş model based 
on the Fiat 131). The R&D department’s mission was to react in a timely and efficient way 
to any production problems in order to increase quality and reduce costs, using existing 
technologies. Since then, R&D capabilities at Tofaş have expended through production 
support (1994), process verification (2002), prototype production (2004), and new product 
development (2007). This is reflected in Tofaş’s level of responsibility in Fiat’s new 
development projects- in particular, they had responsibility for light vehicle production.  
This progress was sequential and is consistent with evolutionary development of MNEs 
described in Cantwell and Mudambi (2005); it was enabled by significant investment from 
the parent company and Koç Holdings.  
 
Tofaş also established R&D facilities in Turkey’s premier institutes, enabling a high level 
of local embeddedness and networking with universities, scientific institutions and supplier 
firms. It intensified local R&D activities in order to access R&D incentives and funding for 
projects undertaken in Technology Free Zones and Parks. In 2010, Tofaş had involvement 
in 69 university and research institute projects, many of which were funded by the EC 
Framework programmes.
11
  
 
Despite growing technological capability in the subsidiary and high level of embeddedness 
in the local context, research activity at Tofaş did not achieve significant levels of internal 
embeddedness. At the same time, our interview with the Chief R&D officer at Fiat also 
confirmed that while Fiat valued the successful partnership implicit in a 40-year joint 
venture they had no plans to allow new technology creation within Tofaş.    
Tofaş concentrates on light commercial vehicles. So far, it is not expected for Tofaş 
to make R&D on new technologies, like intelligent vehicles, vehicle 
communication, fuel cell vehicles, electric and hybrid vehicles. 
In 2010, managers at Tofaş were also exploring plans for Tofaş to emerge as a R&D 
services provider to other car-makers such as GM and Chrysler, for whom they already 
produced cars and prototypes following the economic liberalisation in 1996.  
                                                 
11
 Estimate given in interview. 
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5.2:  Brazil – FIASA and FPT  
 
Fiat Brazil is Fiat’s largest subsidiary in terms of employment, output, and R&D 
expenditure (see Tables 2 and 3). The production plant was established in Betim, Minas 
Gerais, in 1974. Cassiolato et al. (2001) note the important role of government incentives in 
this location decision. The Development Centre (Pólo de Desenvolvimento Giovanni 
Agnelli - PDGA) was established in 1996 and focuses on specific research areas: 
conception and design in the Estilo Center, electronics, chassis and body in Project 
Engineering, experimentation, prototypes and materials engineering in Experimental 
Engineering. An important (and growing) area is materials engineering. Compared to 
Tofaş, the product development team at Fiat Brazil is extensive, comprising 850 workers in 
2010, including 650 engineers dedicated to R&D.  
 
Fiat’s entry in the Brazilian market in the 1970s occurred at a time when the Brazilian 
automotive sector was highly protected and subsidized through high tariffs, import 
substitution and domestic content requirements for foreign firms. Ciravegna (2003) argues 
that structural reforms in the 1990s pushed auto assemblers such as Fiat to undertake costly 
modernization investments in Brazil and Argentina. Quadros and Consoni (2009) note that 
this was primarily market seeking investment based on growing domestic demand in 
Brazil, and output doubling from 1 million units in 1991 to 2 million units in 1997. 
Between 1998 and 2005, however, domestic demand stagnated, but global assemblers, such 
as Fiat and GM, were able to enhance the product development capabilities of their local 
subsidiaries due to substantial growth in intra-regional exports driven by the creation of the 
MERCOSUR regional trading area.  
 
Cassiolato et al. (2001) argue that the MERCOSUR automotive agreements were a catalyst 
for the gradual emergence of regionally integrated production chains in the area, and the 
closer integration of local production in the global value chains of assemblers such as Fiat. 
Fiat’s integrated modular production system was developed in response to the opportunities 
offered by regional integration in MERCOSUR, although in accordance with a strategy of 
regional integration and globalization of production in Brazil, Fiat went beyond adaptation 
and re-engineering. It engaged in design of regional derivatives of its global platforms and 
developed local autonomous engineering centres capable of participating in global platform 
 22 
projects and to provide inputs related to local requirements and design regional derivatives 
to suit local preferences (Quadros and Consoni, 2009).  
 
The global ‘small car’ targeted at emerging markets was born out of these strategic 
initiatives. Queiroz and Carvalho (1999) note that the cars designed for developing 
countries combine the features of sturdiness, simplicity and low cost within new 
technological designs. Fiat Brazil exported the Palio Weekend station wagon to Italy when 
Fiat did not produce a similar product. Fiat pursued upgrading through local R&D by 
involving the Brazilian subsidiary in the design of its platforms aimed at emerging markets. 
An interviewee from Fiat Brazil told us: ‘In the Brazil car market, Fiat has the highest 
market share. We are very proud of this. We are powerful in Brazil. We believe we make 
the best cars for the Brazilians’ (emphasis added), implying a local rather than global 
outlook. 
 
Over time, as Quadros and Queiroz (2001) show, integration of Argentinean and Brazilian 
operations eventually led to the Argentinean subsidiary’s design activities going to Brazil. 
The strategic decision regarding the production of P178 models in Latin America was made 
by Fiat Brazil. New models based on the P178 platform have been developed entirely in 
Brazil. Quadros and Consoni (2009) note that while Fiat adopted a consistent and 
pioneering product policy by designing global cars for emerging markets, the technological 
effort that this policy required, until recently, was centred mainly in Italy (although with 
the participation of Brazilian engineers).  
The role of HQ R&D was confirmed by an interviewee 
  
 the Brazilian subsidiary has evolved from an early phase commonly called 
‘tropicalization’, in which the technology is imported and adapted to local market 
tastes and conditions, to a phase in which several product engineering to define 
model, design and style are present. In the past 8 to 10 years there was a clear 
qualitative upgrade in terms of development, whereas the vast majority of high-end 
research is still carried out in Italy.  
 
Strong ties between the two Fiat subsidiaries in Brazil, and interactions with external 
suppliers allowed more autonomous product development. The subsidiaries collaborated 
on several projects including development of the new Uno. The free flow of knowledge 
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within this network was critical throughout its development. There were also frequent 
visits by local engineers to HQ. An interviewee at FIASA told us that: ‘We are good at 
design. Because of the time differences we are mostly independent. We do not need to 
contact HQ on a routine daily basis but we have a lot of employee rotation’. 
 
Apart from the joint project on bio-fuel technologies with the University of Mina Gerais, 
university links are used mainly to access lab facilities for testing. Universities also 
provided training programmes (seminars and automotive engineering courses) to enhance 
local skills. FPT Brazil participated in initiatives, such as new materials research for flexi-
fuel engines. Its formal and informal interactions with suppliers were decisive in 
developing the flexi-fuel engine. 
 
Our interviews show that the Brazilian subsidiary is competence creating and plays a 
significant role in Fiat’s expansion strategy in relation to its largest market. It plays a 
leading role in defining Fiat’s competitive advantage in other emerging markets. Fiat hopes 
to sell cars developed in Brazil to countries such as India and Venezuela. This enhanced 
role of Fiat Brazil has been based on a mix of parent driven investment and the subsidiary’s 
ability to upgrade its technological capabilities to fulfil its mandate. 
 
5.3 India - FIAL 
 
The Engineering and Development Centre was set up in 2006 as a part of a larger JV 
between Tata Motors and Fiat which involved marketing of Fiat products, licensing of 
Fiat’s engine technology to Tata Motors, and joint R&D. At the time of writing this paper, 
the marketing element of this JV had been dissolved, although the R&D component has not 
been formally closed. However, our study provides some understanding of the tensions and 
constraints involved in the internationalisation of R&D in a hypercompetitive market like 
India. 
 
The Indian auto component industry saw a renaissance post-liberalisation
12
 and the FIAL 
venture is located in the Pune auto belt, which is densely populated with component 
                                                 
12
 Kumaraswamy et al (2012) show the catch-up and integration of auto component firms from India over the 
1992-2002 period.  In particular they find that improved performance based initially on technology 
collaboration with MNEs gave rise to significant increases in own R&D expenditures and saw the leading 
component firms integrate with major auto producers. 
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suppliers serving three major Indian auto firms - Tata Motors, Bajaj Auto and Mahindra & 
Mahindra (M&M). Two of these three domestic firms have been successfully introducing 
cars based on cheap, but competent designs, which threatened a core capability of Fiat.
13
 
The decision to locate in Pune may have reflected a desire to tap into cluster spillovers; 
however,  found no direct evidence of this motivation from our interviews with R&D 
Managers at the Indian subsidiary.  
 
From the FIAL Engineering and Development (E&D) Manager’s point of view, the JV 
with Tata was initiated mainly for cost-cutting: 
Fiat earlier had a collaboration with Premier Inc. - in Kurla in Bombay- that did not 
work well. There was a commercial issue- spare parts were very expensive, it is 
coming from Italy, hence customers were not very happy with after sales. But the 
product was very good- product-wise the customer is very happy, even now. [They] 
decided to close down and join hands with Tata Motors because Tata Motors has 
got a very good network. That was what Fiat wanted to cash on --the spare parts and 
after- sales which is more valuable in this JV.  
 
Reports in the business press suggest that the JV was an opportunistic response. Mishra and 
Surendar (2010) suggest that in 2005, Tata Motors needed to invest in an expensive engine 
development programme in order for its cars to compete and comply with new 
environmental rules. The Fiat-GM power-train, which combined high performance with 
fuel efficiency, was the best engine for small cars, ran on petrol or diesel, and avoided 
heavy investment by Tata. Fiat’s previous collaboration in India had been losing market 
share consistently since the entry of Japanese auto manufacturer Suzuki (in 1981) through a 
JV with the public sector company Maruti, and continued to do so after liberalisation of the 
automobiles sector from 1991. Therefore, Fiat was looking for dealerships to maintain and 
grow its presence in India and Tata Motors was reputed to have the best sales and service 
network in the country. 
 
A rather complex JV was set up around a production facility that would make Fiat cars and 
engines and would also produce Tata’s Manza (sedan car). The JV would sell its 
                                                 
13
 M&M introduced the Scorpio (a SUV vehicle) in 2006, conceptualized and designed by the in-house 
integrated design and manufacturing, team but using systems designed directly by suppliers. Scorpio won a 
number of awards. In 2008, Tata Motors introduced Nano - the world’s cheapest car ($2000) based on frugal 
engineering concepts, and this vehicle received many international awards for design and performance 
although it did not achieve the commercial success that Tata expected.  
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production to Tata who would distribute the cars (Fiat and the Manza) through its 
dealerships. Tata Motors also agreed to buy a certain number of power train engines on 
payment of a royalty. There were other implicit aims. Tata probably hoped to use Fiat’s 
network for their sales of the Tata Nano in Latin America, while Fiat probably expected 
Tata Motors to help it to source cheaper components from India. 
 
R&D managers at FIAL claimed localisation of component manufacture was the key to 
cost cutting. FIAL’s manager noted that his target of locally sourcing 90% of the 
components within the first year of operation was the heaviest localisation requirement 
demand of any MNE for which he had worked. He added that:  
Value Engineering and Value Addition (VAVE) were undertaken with localisation. 
While we were doing localisation there was also design change and design 
modification done to adapt to the local requirements, (road condition, the way we 
drive, ECU calibration modification for our driving situation- we don’t drive at high 
speed).  
Other aspects of VAVE that highlighted by our interview were: 
One is the feature, the ‘decontentment’ (Auto industry term for removing features 
from upcoming model years, usually to save money), one part which is visible. For 
example, the higher-end cars like Emotion are fully motorised, whereas Active is 
having motorised in front and manual behind. So the customer is able to see the 
difference and gets a feeling that I am paying less hence I am getting slightly less. 
That is one part. But more than that what is important is that customer does not 
know that he has got a slightly less cost without a compromise. That is more 
intelligent work.  
 
We do a lot of VAVE workshops. Let us say, we will strip open a part and we will 
discuss each and every component about where we can save cost. This is one kind 
of exercise. I also strip open the competitor’s, which is in the cars which is already 
sold so not infringing anyone’s patents. So we strip open that and try and 
understand what is it that we can get benefit. It is easy to reduce the cost but at the 
same time one must know where you are compromising. …. This is one kind of 
exercise that is hugely done here. This is done with the knowledge of the HQ. Many 
times they also come and participate.  
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We also do cost engineering exercise by breaking into the component details. 
Therefore if you ask me to evaluate a product I get into finer detail, each and every 
component such as what are the materials used, how much machining is done, what 
treatment is done on that etc.  
 
Despite the requirement to reduce costs and tap into reverse engineering skills, it was clear 
that R&D outlays ultimately depended on sales performance. Following initially positive 
beginnings both models introduced by Fiat ran into problems. Mishra and Surender (2010) 
note that the Punto was perceived in the Indian market as underpowered for its premium 
price, while the sedan Linea had air-conditioning problems that undermined its sales. In our 
interviews the R&D manager was particularly irritated with Fiat HQ’s approach to the air-
conditioning problems and the rigid procedures for changing design details. He told us that:  
 
Europeans designed the air conditioning in our car and there was no issue earlier in 
Brazil or Europe, but in India we said that the AC won’t work, the temperature in 
North India is 48 C. Even at 40 there is high humidity which requires a very strong 
AC system. Our car did not have a very strong AC system. We initially highlighted 
that there will be a problem but they did not realise that there will be a problem.  
 
It is very natural that the HQ will be very comfortable if the foreign location has 
obedient people who can produce as per their design and direction, their job is to 
produce as per design and sell it. ... There was tremendous supervision as the Fiat 
HQ was not sure of Indian companies, and whether the engineers working here can 
do a good job.  
 
These rigidities probably undermined Fiat’s competitive position in the Indian small car 
market, which, following liberalisation, had become quite competitive, with both 
Volkswagen and Toyota making deep inroads into the market shares of Fiat and Tata 
Motors. Fiat subsequently blamed Tata Motors dealers for not investing sufficient effort in 
selling Fiat cars, and in 2010 established its own showrooms and took over management of 
Fiat sales. It announced that it would launch the Cinquecento in India in 2013.  
 
Expansion of operations at FIAL was constrained by Fiat’s choice of product, which 
threatened to undermine the size of its R&D function in India. However, FIAL’s manager 
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was remained optimistic because he believed that, in time, India could become a hub for 
the manufacture of right hand drive cars and this would help the R&D effort in India.  
 
6. Discussion 
 
Like several other companies in the automobiles sector, Fiat embarked on a strategy of 
globalization of production and R&D designed to cut costs and penetrate emerging 
markets. Its R&D in emerging markets was of the home technology exploiting type. The 
case study of Fiat and its three emerging host markets provides an understanding of some 
of the factors important to the development of competence creating subsidiaries in R&D; 
we discuss our findings below. 
 
6.1 Managerial mindset of parent company and impact of strategic miscalculations 
 
The centralization of R&D in Fiat is similar to that in other car companies such as GM and 
Chrysler, and other companies that produce complex products based on global value chains 
– (see e.g. the discussion in Dodgson et al., 2008: 186-205). The many stages involved in 
the production and technical performance of complex products renders management of 
dispersed activity quite challenging and decision making over production and R&D usually 
resides in the parent firm. Thus the evolutions in even very successful companies (e.g. 
Toyota) may not reach all of their geographically dispersed competence creating 
subsidiaries.  
 
In Fiat, we found evidence of global integration accompanied by control of technology 
remaining with the central Fiat R&D unit, and assignment of roles to avoid non-duplication 
although at the expense of intra-company competition. While Fiat has been very successful 
in effecting information flows among subsidiaries and between HQ and subsidiaries 
through the use of ICT and exchanges of engineers, it was reluctant to make subsidiaries 
autonomous even when they were mandated to make improvements to respond to local 
consumer needs. An example of this was the air-conditioning problem which ultimately 
may have cost Fiat its Indian market share. 
 
What is the explanation for the managerial mind-set of retaining control? It might lie in the 
nature of the subsidiary. The R&D subsidiaries in Turkey and India were JVs and there 
perhaps was reluctance to share technologies between the partner firms. However, the 
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Brazilian subsidiary was wholly owned and apparently trusted by Fiat HQ, but our 
interviews revealed that it took some eight years after P178 before the subsidiary was able 
to act autonomously. For instance, in 1996-2002 FIASA filed very few patents, which 
suggests considerable ‘organizational inertia’ (Criscuolo and Narula, 2007) and which 
prevented the development of a multi-hub structure of R&D.   
 
The success of centralized R&D strategies depends critically on the soundness of the 
product market strategies chosen by the parent. As noted in Section 4, Fiat’s ‘global car’ 
strategy owed much to Fiat’s success in MERCOSUR, and features of the Fiat Palio that 
had proven successful in the Latin American market. However, what was right for the Latin 
America was not successful for the Turkish and Indian markets. This suggests insufficient 
local market information informing the choice of model and, more importantly, lack of a 
contingency plan when the Palio proved unsuccessful. This miscalculation had profound 
implications for subsidiary performance and might also have influenced the evolution of 
competence creation roles. 
 
6.2 Product market performance and subsidiary capability  
 
Table 4 showed that Fiat Brazil was the most successful R&D subsidiary on several 
performance measures (head count, sales, collaborative patents) and Fiat’s biggest market 
share was in the Brazilian market. Many scholars see this as reflecting the superior 
capabilities of the Brazilian subsidiary which led to its emergence as a strategic leader 
among the Fiat subsidiaries in emerging markets. Although, Quadros and Consoni (2009) 
argue that the combination of local capability in product development and attainment of 
sales leadership in the Brazilian automobile market contributed to Fiat’s increasing 
technological activities in Brazil, Quadros and Queiroz (2001) suggest that the scale of 
operation was the main reason for the concentration of design and management 
competencies in Brazil. This suggests the existence of a virtuous circle in which sales 
leadership depends on scale which allows the development of specialization valuable to the 
whole MNE. 
 
Our case study sheds light on what happens when sales projections are not realised and the 
virtuous circle between high sales growth, creation of specialised assets and development 
of trust and confidence in the subsidiary’s capability is not developed. Sales that do not 
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meet projections affect what subsidiaries can do and the complexity of their activities. This 
was explained to us by the Indian R&D manager: 
 
Lots of activities depend on how much budget is available. If we have sold 
sufficient number of cars here I could used the money on setting up the rig here and 
so on… (Brazil) produces 5000 cars a day. That is the difference, their profitability 
is huge. If the market requires a change I need it now can you give it? No…. Profit 
is being made, that means a lot [for what we can do]. Latin America is the leading 
market for Fiat now. But if India, China and Russia are focused well, it is a huge 
market. 
 
In turn the type of activity the subsidiary is allowed to undertake has a major effect on its 
ability to retain skilled engineers who want to work on technically demanding projects. The 
absorptive capacity of the R&D subsidiary and its R&D capability depends on skilled 
engineers. The technological capability of the subsidiary is dependent on its product market 
performance an area where the direction was set by Fiat’s HQ. Tofaş may have avoided a 
downward spiral due in part to its independence from Fiat for funding for R&D. Its 
decision to offer R&D services to Peugeot and Citroen is significant and shows that the 
subsidiary wants to expand in order to retain its skilled employees.   
 
Comparing among subsidiaries it is difficult to pinpoint why Fiat Brazil was so much more 
competitive (shown by Fiat’s market share) than the Turkish and Indian subsidiaries. 
Dunford (2009) points out the Latin American market was the most protected of Fiat’s 
markets outside Europe and was not subject to the same pressures of competition as the 
liberalizing Turkish and Indian markets. This would explain why, with substantially the 
same product and technology, Fiat was more successful in Brazil. 
 
6.3 Embeddedness and mode of entry 
 
There is an interesting dilemma highlighted by the case study of Fiat related to the 
complicated relationship between local and internal embeddedness. Similar to other firms 
confronted with the complexities of operating in emerging economy conditions, Fiat sought 
to minimize operational risks by opting for a JV strategy in production and R&D with local 
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partners in Turkey and India.
14
 These local partners were highly embedded in their 
environmental contexts and the parent saw centrality and collaboration in local networks as 
favouring increased R&D investment in those locations. It is unclear why, despite evidence 
of high technological capability (large number of national patent filings), Tofaş achieved 
only low levels of internal embeddedness. For example, we found no evidence of co-
invention, establishment of a design center or work on new technologies and although 
Tofaş mentioned technology contributions to other MNE affiliates these were not 
mentioned by the parent firm.  
 
The sensitive nature of why one subsidiary was more embedded internally than another, 
made it difficult to address this directly in interviews with either Fiat management or Tofaş. 
However, the literature on mode of entry offers some explanations. Deloitte (2010) 
estimates that most research JVs terminate earlier than expected and that the median 
duration of a JV is three years. Further, JVs are often set up with potential competitors and 
their management in the context of R&D may be impossible without finite and clear 
expectations about the research outputs. It is also clear that greenfield managers are more 
likely to be treated as ‘insiders’ and JV mangers  are more likely to be treated as ‘outsiders’ 
as the latter do not have the same degree of socialization within the MNE network.  For 
both these reasons, we can conjecture that the JV nature of the Turkish subsidiary may 
have made Tofaş less relevant as a candidate for intra-MNE strategic collaboration.   Tofaş’ 
decision to keep patents on all R&D work done for Fiat is also consistent with such 
reasoning.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Our case study shows that although Fiat has a large number of production subsidiaries in 
emerging markets, only three of its emerging market  subsidiaries undertook any R&D and 
only one of them (in Brazil) came close to possessing the characteristics of a competence-
creating subsidiary, i.e. becoming a strategic leader with more product development 
responsibilities and exhibiting dual embeddedness.  This suggests that rise of competence-
creating subsidiaries in emerging markets is difficult. Furthermore, technology creation 
                                                 
14
 Raff et al., (2006) show that firms that have more profitable assets will always choose greenfield 
investment over JV. This suggests that entering a JV in two emerging economies was a reflection of Fiat’s 
poor competitive position.  Similarly and as noted earlier Cantwell and Mudambi (2011) suggest that laggard 
firms will find it more difficult to attract good quality partners to tap into local advantages. 
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requires active scanning and identification of new sources of ideas -- a managerial 
capability that did not emerge from our interviews with CRF- the parent R&D lab. As a 
consequence of centralised control, we found that subsidiary role enhancement in Brazil 
was driven largely by parent firm investments.   
 
The success of the Brazilian subsidiary raises the question of why the Indian and Turkish 
subsidiaries did not develop into competence-creating subsidairies.  The failure of 
competence-creation in subsidiaries in emerging markets has been rarely addressed in the 
literature, but our embedded case study design allows conjectures: we can suggest two 
explanations.  
  
First, we found that the evolution of subsidiaries’ R&D activities was determined by the 
extent of success in achieving good product market performance rather than possession of 
technological capability alone. Thus local competition and the company’s overall product 
market strategy were crucial determinants of an increased subsidiary role. Market 
performance is constrained by the success of the HQ product market strategy.  Here, 
decisions about what models to sell in which markets were made by Fiat HQ.  Poor strategy 
formulation at headquarters as well as poor execution of strategy led to poor competitive 
outcomes at subsidiary level.  
 
The case of the Turkish subsidiary is very puzzling since it was well established and 
showed high levels of external embeddedness and technological capability although low 
levels of internal embeddedness. Thus our second conjecture is that R&D subsidiaries set 
up as part of JVs are less likely to become embedded in the MNE’s internal network and 
being considered capable of executing a competence creating mandate. 
 
We hope that future empirical work on competence creating subsidiaries will test these 
arguments more rigorously focusing on the selection issues implicit in the choice of 
competence-creating subsidiaries.  Our case study shows that technological capability and 
local environmental factors are not the only factors influencing a competence creation 
mandate-  the mode of entry and the effectiveness  of HQ strategy  may also influence a 
subsidiary’s competence-creation role. 
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Appendix 1: List of interviews conducted 
 
Country Interviewee Designation Interview Date Location 
 
 
 
 
 
ITALY:  
Fiat 
 
1) Chief R&D Engineer 5 January 2009  Tofaş  
Bursa/Turkey 
2) Quality and Relations 
Director  
3) Alternative Fuels Engine 
Director  
4) Group Materials Labs- New 
Materials Scouting & 
Nanomaterials Department 
Manager 
5) Quality System Manager  
 
 
 
 
14 December 2010 
 
 
 
Centro Ricerche 
Fiat (Fiat 
Research Centre) 
Turin/Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
TURKEY:  
Tofaş 
 
6) Former R&D Director  20 January 2009 Platform R&D  
Bursa/Turkey 
7) R&D Director 
 
7 February 2009  Tofaş  
Bursa/Turkey 
8) Chief R&D Engineer of 
Mekatro Co. (Tofaş’s 
subsidiary)  
13 January 2009 (updated 
2012) 
Mekatro R&D 
Gebze/Turkey 
 
 
INDIA:  
Fiat India 
Automobiles 
Limited (FIAL) 
9) Vice President of 
Engineering & Design (E&D) 
30 August 
2011 
FIAL  
Pune/ India 
 
 
 
 
 
BRAZIL:  
Fiat Automotive 
South America 
(FIASA) 
 
10) Manager of Powertrain 
Technologies Engines and 
Transmissions  
3 May 2011 Belo Horizonte/ 
Brazil  
11) Director of Product 
Engineering  
3 May 2011 Belo Horizonte/ 
Brazil 
12) Manager of Procurement 
and Supplier Development  
13) Coordinator of Product 
Engineering- Innovation and 
Methodology 
   
 
 
01 July 2010 
 
 
FIASA 
Betim, Minas 
Gerais/Brazil 
 
14) Director of Insituto de 
Competencias Empresariais 
(ICE-Fiat)  
15) Manager of the Committee 
for Innovation (FPT) of ICE-
Fiat  
 
 
 
01 July 2010 
 
 
FIASA Betim, 
Minas 
Gerais/Brazil 
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